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Introduction
The fi rst fi ve papers of this issue of the Croatian Journal of Philosophy 
presents the proceedings of a mini conference with Michael Devitt that 
was held in Rijeka in April 2017 under the title ‘Linguistic Intuitions 
and Natural Kinds’ organized by the Croatian Society for Analytic Phi-
losophy. The other four papers are mainly concerned with different as-
pects of rationality.
Nenad Miščević’s paper “Intuitions: Epistemology and Metaphysics 
of Language” deals with epistemology of linguistic intuitions, and de-
fends a moderate Voice-of-competence view in discussion with Michael 
Devitt, who sees them as products of general intelligence or Central 
Processing Unit. The second part of the paper deals with validity of 
linguistic intuitions and offers a compromise solution: linguistic intu-
itions are valid because their object, the standard linguistic entities, are 
production -and response-dependent. The solution is briefl y situated on 
the map of general response-dependentism.
Michael Devitt’s and Dunja Jutronić’s papers are direct responses to 
Nenad Miščević’s articles “Reply to Michael Devitt”, and “Reply to Dun-
ja Jutronić”, both published in 2014. Miščević defends a modifi ed ver-
sion (“MoVoC”) of the received view that these intuitions are the product 
of a linguistic competence. Michael Devitt has always rejected all ver-
sions of the received view urging instead that intuitions are, like percep-
tual judgments, empirical theory-laden central-processor responses to 
phenomena. He emphasizes here, against Miščević, that the claim about 
a speaker’s intuitions about strings is not to be confl ated with a claim 
about her understanding of strings. Furthermore, he develops his claim 
that Miščević’s MoVoC is implausible in three important aspects. Devitt 
fi nally points out that these are not the main problems for MoVoC.
In her contribution “Intuitions Once Again!” Dunja Jutronić fi rst 
presents some of her most important answers to Miščević’s objections 
to her 2014 paper. Secondly and more importantly, she points out that 
there is a possible confusion or misunderstanding about the distinction 
between the object-level (sentence produced) and meta-level (sentence 
judged). Jutronić argues that competentionalist actually confl ates ob-
ject and meta levels and shows the fi nal consequences of such a con-
fl ation Finally, she briefl y comments on the so-called ‘Route Question’, 
that is the path from the underlying competence to the central processor 
and argue that Miščević, or any competentionalist, cannot provide an 
explanation for it.
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Zdenka Brzović’s paper “Devitt’s Promiscuous Essentialism” exam-
ines Devitt’s version of essentialism, a view that stirred a lot of debate 
amongst philosophers of biology by going against the mainstream view 
of “death of essentialism” in evolutionary biology. Brzović goes through 
the main tenets of the essentialist view, examines the relation between 
Devitt’s view and the so-called traditional essentialism, and the cluster 
approaches to natural kinds. She concludes that Devitt holds a very 
fl exible variety of pluralistic essentialism that she terms promiscuous 
essentialism.
Urška Martinc in her paper “Devitt’s ‘Intrinsic Biological Essential-
ism’” primarily focuses on Michael Devitt’s article “Resurrecting Biolog-
ical Essentialism”. Using examples from biology and the analogy from 
some examples from chemistry, Martinc analyses advantages and dis-
advantages of Devitt’s arguments for intrinsic biological essentialism.
In “Structured Propositions, Unity, and the Sense-Nonsense Distinc-
tion” Octavian Ion starting point of discussion is Herman Cappelen 
(2013) who thought that we need to rethink and reintroduce the impor-
tant distinction between sense and nonsense that was neglected during 
Logical Positivism’s demise. However, Ion’s delineation of the bounds of 
sense is different from Cappelen’s. One of his main goals is to argue that 
category mistakes are paradigmatic examples of nonsensical sentences.
Martina Blečić in her contribution “Do Conversational Implicatures 
Express Arguments?” suggests that the idea that conversational impli-
catures express argument can be signifi cant for the notion of communi-
cational responsibility. It is proposed that we should consider conver-
sational implicatures as reason-giving arguments in which the speaker 
(arguer) addresses a hearer who does not need to reply. In such cases, 
the speaker is not trying to convince the hearer to accept his position but 
is explicitly stating a reason in support of his intended message. Blečić 
argues that her approach can strengthen the idea of the speaker’s com-
municational responsibility for an implicated message even in the case 
when he wants to distance himself from it.
Conspiracy theories seem to play an increasing role in public po-
litical discourse, and Daniel Cohnitz’s paper “Conspiracy Paranoia: On 
the Rationality of Conspiracy Theories” urges that we should fi nd out 
why conspirational thought is recently gaining such support and how 
to respond to it. People who believe in conspiracy theories are often ridi-
culed as nutcases or paranoid crackpots, while they portray themselves 
as particularly critical, better informed and enlightened responsible 
citizens. One of the central questions that needs to be answered here is 
what mindset leads to the believe in conspiracy theories? Finding out 
which of the two above mentioned characterizations is correct, is crucial 
for coming up with the appropriate response to the rise of conspirational 
thought.
In his paper “Wisdom and Reason” Andrei Mărăşoiu presents Ryan’s 
(2012) theory of wisdom as deep rationality. Namely, to believe or act 
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wisely is to believe or act in a justifi ed way, informed by a body of other 
justifi ed beliefs about the good life. Ryan elaborates the view along evi-
dentialist lines: one’s belief or act is justifi ed when it is based on the best 
available evidence. Mărăşoiu points to a number of counterexamples to 
this approach and he argues that, instead of evidentialism, Ryan’s view 
should include virtue theory, which helps explain the seeming counter-
examples. He focuses on the virtues of openness to experience, and of 
steadfastness in the face of experience.
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